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  In this paper, we give additional details about the model in our paper “A Political 
Economy Model of Congressional Careers” (Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2004)), as well as the 
computational methods we use to solve and estimate the model, and the construction of the data 
set.  
In our model, we assume that politicians make decisions about running for reelection, 
running for higher office, and exiting from Congress (either to retirement or another type of 
work) every two years—the length of a House term. Politicians are forward looking, and realize 
that current decisions will affect the distribution of future payoffs. Thus, they must solve a 
dynamic optimization problem to determine the current decision that maximizes expected 
present value of lifetime utility. We assume that politicians’ behavior can be represented as if 
they solve a discrete choice dynamic programming (DP) problem to arrive at optimal current 
period decisions. This means we must solve that DP problem ourselves in order to form the 
likelihood function for the model (see, e.g., Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) and Rust (1994)). 
In order to solve the DP problem we use a standard backsolving procedure. We assume 
that the earliest age at which a person can be elected to Congress is 30 and if a politician lives to 
age 80, then he/she must exit Congress at that point.
1 These assumptions imply that the dynamic 
optimization problem has (at most) 25 decision periods. Furthermore, it greatly simplifies our 
analysis to assume that exit from Congress is an absorbing state—that is, the politician cannot 
return to Congress after leaving, regardless of the age at which he or she exits.
2  
When a politician exits Congress (either voluntarily or via electoral defeat), he/she 
chooses between two post-congressional career options or retirement. We do not model choice 
behavior after that point. Exogenous death and retirement transition rates govern the expected 
present value of each post-congressional option. 
The presentation of our model and of the technical issues related to its solution and 
estimation can usefully be decomposed into several parts.  These are: (i) post-congressional 
payoffs; (ii) the decisions of senators; (iii) the decisions of representatives; (iv) probability 
functions and the evolution of exogenous state variables; (v) computational issues; and (vi) the 
likelihood function.  We now describe these in turn. 
                                                           
1 Despite some well-publicized exceptions, entering Congress prior to age 30 or staying after age 80 are rare events.  
2 Returning to Congress after an exit is also a rare event (it occurs in less than 5% of the cases), so we feel this is a 
reasonable simplification.    2
1. Post-Congressional  Payoffs 
At the end of each two-year period, a politician who is in Congress has the option of exiting. A 
key feature of our model is that, when a politician exits from Congress, he/she can choose 
between two post-congressional employment options, or else retire. The employment options are 
(i) work in a private sector occupation, or (ii) work in a public sector occupation (i.e., enter 
another political job). By other political jobs we are thinking primarily of appointed positions 
that the politician may be offered, such as cabinet posts, bureaucratic positions, etc.
3   
The wage the politician would receive in each of the two alternatives is determined by 
the politician’s age, education, and variables characterizing his/her congressional experience. We 
specify log wage functions that are similar in functional form to those postulated in the human 
capital literature (Mincer (1958)), except for the inclusion of the congressional experience 
variables.  Assume the wage functions take the form: 
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Here, Wijt is the wage offered to individual i in occupation j in period t, for j = 1,2, and t = 
1,…,25. Note that t indexes two-year increments in age from 32 through 80. Since we present the 
decision process for an individual i, we do not need separate age and calendar time subscripts.  
This specification allows for the possibility that individuals have different unobserved 
endowments of skill for each occupation (as in Keane and Wolpin (1997)).  The variable Skilli 
indexes the (unobserved) endowment vectors and is simply a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
(unobserved) type of politician i is “skilled.”  The case where the dummy variable Skilli = 0 
corresponds to the default or “normal” type. The error term εijt represents the purely stochastic 
component of the wage offer, which is revealed when the politician exits Congress. 
Turning to the observables in the wage function, BAi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
individual i has a bachelor’s degree and zero if not, and JDi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
he/she has a law degree and zero otherwise. THit and TSit are the number of prior terms served in 
the House and Senate, respectively. COMit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if, during the prior 
                                                           
3 We abstract from the fact that a politician might have to run (or be confirmed) for some non-congressional 
positions.   3
term in the House, a representative had served on a major House committee.
4 Political scientists 
typically define the major House committees as Ways and Means, Appropriations, and Rules 
(see, e.g., Deering and Smith (1990)).  The idea here is that service on one of these major 
committees may augment the human capital one brings to post-congressional employment. For 
example, being a member of the Ways and Means committee might generate knowledge that 
would enhance one’s value as a lobbyist for companies trying to obtain tax breaks. 
Finally,  VEit is an indicator function for whether the politician exited Congress 
voluntarily rather than via losing an election bid. Our rationale for including this variable in the 
wage function is that the mode of exit (i.e., voluntarily or by losing), may affect the value of the 
politician in certain types of jobs. Whether the overall effect on wages is positive or negative is a 
priori ambiguous. On the one hand, losing an election may reduce the value of the politician in 
jobs where popularity is important (such as being a spokesperson for a company). On the other 
hand, exiting Congress voluntarily may signal the politician’s desire to “slow down” and hence 
reduce the perceived value of the politician to potential employers.  
A third option upon exit is retirement. In this case, the politician may (depending on age 
and length of service) receive congressional pension payments whose value depends on his/her 
employment history. We describe the congressional pension rules in detail in the paper. Here, we 
just write the pension rule as: 
 
(2) ) , , ( it it it it TS TH Age f PE =  
 
which indicates that the pension payment PEit that individual i will begin to receive if he/she 
retires at time t depends on his/her age as well as terms in the House and Senate.  Then, the 
payoff in the retirement option is:   
 
(3)  it VE L it it VE PE PR α α + + = . 
 
The parameter αL captures the monetized value of leisure. The parameter αVE captures an 
additional monetized value of leisure for people who exit Congress voluntarily rather than via 
losing an election. For instance, αVE > 0 captures the notion that those who exit voluntarily desire 
to “slow down,” so that their value of leisure after exiting congress is relatively high. This 
                                                           
4 Committee membership is less important in the modern Senate (Sinclair (1989)).   4
parameter enables us to capture a prominent feature of the data: those who exit Congress 
voluntarily are much more likely to choose retirement as a post-congressional option than further 
employment, even conditional on age and other observed characteristics.  
Equations (1) and (3) give the per-period payoffs for each of the three post-congressional 
alternatives. We now describe the present value of the utility stream from each option. As noted 
previously, we do not model behavior beyond the first choice that the politician makes after 
leaving Congress. Rather, we assume that exogenous death and retirement transition 
probabilities govern outcomes from that point onward. Specifically, if the politician chooses 
employment option j, for j = 1,2, then he/she will remain in that alternative until either retirement 
or death. Once the politician enters retirement he/she stays in that state until death. Let πr(t), and 
πd(t) be the retirement probability and death probability, respectively. These are written as 
functions of t to allow them to depend on the age at exit from Congress.
5 Letting δ denote the 
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while, for the public sector, we have: 
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In equation (5), α2W is a parameter that captures the additional utility from holding another 
political job. Given that politicians get non-pecuniary rewards from being in Congress, it seems 
reasonable to assume they may also get non-pecuniary rewards from other political jobs. The 
parameters  α1C and α2C capture the monetized value of having served on a major House 
committee, which could generate additional income from speaking engagements, consulting, 
book contracts and other similar activities. We allow the value from these activities (which we 
do not observe) to differ depending on whether the politician’s post-congressional occupation is 
in the private or public sector. Similarly, the present discounted value of the retirement option is: 
                                                           
5 In our empirical work we also let them vary with age after exit from Congress, but it simplifies the exposition to 
ignore this.   5
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We also assume there is an idiosyncratic (politician specific) taste shock associated with 
each post-congressional option. Thus, the overall values of the three options may be written Vj = 
PVj + ξj for j = 1,2,3. We assume the vector ξit = (ξi1t, ξi2t, ξi3t,) is i.i.d type I extreme value with 
standard deviation ρE. Following Rust (1987), this assumption allows us to form simple 
expressions for the choice probabilities and the expected maximum value of the exit options, 
which we now describe. 
We assume that politicians do not see the vector of taste shocks ξit  prior to exiting 
Congress.
6  Nor, as noted earlier, do they see the stochastic component of wage draws εit = (εi1t, 
εi2t). Upon deciding to exit, the εit and ξit values are revealed, and the politician chooses the 
alternative with the highest value. Therefore, in order to form the expected value of the option to 
exit Congress, the politician must form the expected maximum over the payoff draws for all 
three alternatives (integrating over the εit and ξit). 
To achieve a more compact notation, let XPit denote the set of state variables that are 
relevant for the determination of post-congressional payoffs.  We have: 
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Then, we write the present value of the employment and retirement options as: 
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6 This type of independence assumption is crucial for the type of solution method developed by Rust (1987). 
However, one might expect politicians who voluntarily exit congress to have a higher value of leisure, on average, 
and to therefore have relatively high values of ξi3t, making them more likely to choose retirement as the post-
congressional option. This is precisely the sort of dependence that our parameter αVE captures, since it can be 
interpreted as letting the mean of ξi3t be conditioned on VEit. In general, as Rust has noted, letting distributions of 
the stochastic terms be conditioned on lagged observables is the ideal way to relax the strength of the independence 
assumptions underlying his approach. The parameters α1C , α2C and α2W play a similar role in our model.    6
to highlight the fact that the present values of wages in post-congressional employment options 
depend on the state variables XPit, which are known at the time of the decision to exit Congress, 
and the stochastic terms εit, which are not. 
The expected value of the decision to exit Congress can then be written: 
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Here, f(ε) is the joint density of the vector of wage draws εit = (εi1t, εi2t), which we assume to be a 
bivariate normal, εit ~ N(0, AA’), where  
 













  Given this structure, we also obtain simple expressions for the probability that each post-
congressional alternative is chosen.  Let dikt be an indicator variable equal to 1 if option k is 
chosen and 0 otherwise, where k = 1 denotes the private sector, k = 2 denotes the public sector, 
and k = 3 denotes retirement. Then, the probability that politician i decides to retire is simply: 
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If the politician chooses employment in either the private or public sector, a wage is observed, so 
we must form a choice probability conditional on the wage in order to obtain the appropriate 
likelihood function contribution (see equation (34) in Section 6, which describes the construction 
of the likelihood function). 
2.  Decisions of Senators 
In this section we consider the decisions of a sitting senator. Of course, senators do have options 
of running for other offices, like president or governor. But the frequency of such decisions is 
fairly low, and to include them would drastically complicate the model.  Thus, we do not model   7
the decisions of senators to run for other offices.
7 Given this simplifying assumption, the 
behavior of senators is much simpler to describe than that of representatives (who can also 
choose to run for the Senate), because they have fewer options. This is why we describe the 
behavior of senators first.  
  Like representatives, we assume that senators make decisions every two years. It turns 
out that this is useful, even though a Senate term is six years, because early exit by senators is 
not uncommon in the data. The set of options a senator faces depends on whether his/her seat is 
up for election in a given period. Define a state variable ST (“Senate term”) that is equal to 1, 2 
or 3 as the senator has served 2, 4 or the full 6 years of his/her term. If ST = 1 or ST = 2 then the 
senator has two options: to continue sitting in the Senate or exit Congress. If ST = 3 then the 
senator has to decide whether to run for reelection or exit Congress. 
 Denote  by  XSit the set of state variables relevant to the decisions and/or electoral 
prospects of senators. We have: 
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Obviously this includes XPit, the set of state variables that determine the distribution of post-
congressional payoffs should the politician exit the Senate, already defined in (7). The state 
vector also contains measures of the political climate, which influence the senator’s re-election 
chances, denoted SOSit (“state of the state”) and SOWt (“state of the world”). These indicate, 
respectively, whether conditions in the senator’s home state and aggregate conditions favor 
election of a Democrat or a Republican.  
   We describe the construction of SOS and SOD in detail in Section 7. Here, it suffices to 
say that, in each period, we classify each state in the U.S. as being relatively good, neutral, or 
bad for the election of Democrats (SOS) based on the state’s vote in presidential elections 
relative to the national vote.
8 Similarly, in each period we classify the situation in the U.S. as a 
whole (SOW), based on the aggregate outcome of all congressional elections to the House of 
Representatives. (Note that we construct SOSit as a measure of the state of the state relative to 
the aggregate state of the world). 
                                                           
7 If a senator does become a governor we treat it just like any other post-congressional political job. 
8 Minnesota, for example, would always be a good state for Democrats, whereas a number of southern states have 
shifted from being good for Democrats to good for Republicans during our sample period.   8
We assume that the senator knows the state of his/her state as well as the state of the 
world prior to making the decision on whether to exit, run for reelection or stay in the Senate. 
The evolution of SOSit and SOWt over time and how these variables affect election probabilities 
are described in Section 4. At this point we simply note that SOSit and SOWt each evolve over 
time according to a Markov process with transition probabilities  ) | ( 1 , 1 , , it t i t i SOS SOS SOS P p + + =  
and ) | ( 1 1 t t SOWt SOW SOW P p + + = . 
Cleary the variable Partyi, which indicates whether the politician is a Democrat or a 
Republican, is also a relevant state variable, since it is its interaction with SOSit and SOWt that 
affects the politician’s chances in the next election. A politician’s party affiliation may also be an 
important determinant of the probability of achieving important legislative accomplishments 
while serving in the Senate.  We assume that political party is a fixed characteristic of the 
politician.
9  
In addition to differ with respect to their (unobserved) political skills (summarized by the 
variable Skilli, which is contained in XPit), we also allow for the possibility that politicians have 
different unobserved preferences for holding office, which affect the utility they derive from 
important legislative accomplishments. The variable Achievei indexes the (unobserved) 
preference-type of a politician and is simply a dummy variable equal to 1 if the politician is an 
“achiever” (i.e., he/she values personal legislative achievements).  As with the variable Skilli, the 
case where the dummy variable Achievei = 0 corresponds to the default or “normal” type. Hence, 
since there are two possible skill-types and two possible preference-types, our analysis admits 
four different unobserved types of politicians. 
Another important state variable that may affect a senator’s chances in the next election 
and is therefore relevant to the decisions of senators is whether the politician is currently 
involved in a scandal. The variable Scandalit is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
politician i is involved in a scandal at time t. Finally, Cohorti is a variable indicating whether a 
                                                           
9 There are instances of politicians changing parties while in Congress over the sample period, but to include the 
possibility of changing party would substantially complicate our model, and such instances are sufficiently rare 
(they occur in less than half of a percent of the cases), that we feel it is a reasonable approximation to ignore them. 
   9
politician entered Congress in 1947-1965, 1967-1975 or 1977-1993. We use this variable to 
capture changes in congressional wages over time.
10 
  Consider first the decision of a senator when ST = 1. This case corresponds to a situation 
where the senator’s seat is not up for election, so that the senator’s choice is simply to stay in 
office or to exit. If the senator decides to stay in office, then he/she receives the per-period 
payoff from sitting in the Senate, which includes the possibility of achieving an important 
legislative accomplishment in the current session of Congress. Denote by VS(XSit, s) the value of 
choosing the Senate option given the relevant state variables (XSit, s), where the second element 
of the state vector indicates that the politician is already a sitting senator. We have: 
 
(14)  ) , ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( 1 , 1 s XS EV t XS p Achieve t W s XS V t i d Sit AS it AS i S S it S + − + + + + = π δ µ α α . 
 
The first four terms in (14) capture the immediate payoff from staying in the Senate at 
time t. WS(t) is the wage the senator will receive, and the term αS captures the monetized value of 
the per-period non-pecuniary rewards from being in the Senate. While all senators receive these 
rewards, those of the type who value personal legislative achievements (i.e., Achievei = 1) may 
also receive additional utility in any given period while sitting in the Senate if he/she achieves an 
important legislative accomplishment in that period.  We denote the probability of a policy 
achievement by a senator by pAS(XSit), and αAS is the monetized value of the utility the   
achievement generates.
11 The term µ1Sit is a stochastic component to i’s utility from being in the 
Senate at time t. This may capture random fluctuations in the non-pecuniary rewards over time.  
  The last term in (14) captures the future component of the value from staying in the 
Senate. This is equal to the discount factor, δ, times the probability of survival to the next 
decision period, (1-πd(t)), times the expected value of the state the politician will arrive at in 
period t+1 given survival, EV(XSi,t+1, s).  Given (7) and (13), we see that: 
 
                                                           
10 Wage paths were very similar for members within each entering cohort defined here, regardless of entry year. 
Thus, we constructed cohort specific wage paths using time-specific averages across the cohort members. If we let 
each entering class be its own cohort (i.e., have its own wage path), it drastically expands the state space, and 
increases computational time. This cost did not appear justified given the limited variation of wages within cohorts.   
11 The assumption that only “achievers” derive utility from accomplishments guarantees that αS  and  αAS are 
separately identified. Otherwise, identification would hinge subtly on variation of pAS, the probability of 
achievement, with XSit..   10
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which means that if the politician stays in the Senate, and lives until t+1, then age increases by 2, 
number of terms in the Senate increases by 1/3, the changes in SOS and SOW and the occurrence 
of a scandal are uncertain (indicated by ?), and ST increases by 1. Uncertainty about the changes 
in SOS and SOW is one reason that the politician must take the expectation in (14).
12 The other 
reason is that the politician does not know what the realization of the i.i.d. taste shock µ1Sit will 
be in period t+1. (Note that µ1Sit is in fact a state variable relevant to the time t decision, but since 
it is serially independent we follow convention and do enter it explicitly in our value function 
expressions). 
  We next develop the expression for EV(XSi,t+1, s), the expected value of the next period 
state, should the senator remain in the Senate. First, suppose that SOSi,t+1 and SOWt+1 are known, 
so that the only uncertainty is with regard to µ1Si,t+1.  At time t+1 the politician will again choose 
whether to stay in the Senate or exit, so EV(XSi,t+1, s) is the expected maximum of VS(XSi,t+1, s) 
and VE(XPi,t+1). If we put the model in a form in which VS and VE both have additive independent 
type I extreme value error terms, then we can again use Rust’s (1987) close-form formula for the 
expected maximum. Although VE does not have an error term, we can achieve an equivalent 
representation by assuming that µ1Si,t+1 is equal to the difference of two independent type I 
extreme value error terms, each with standard deviation ρ1S. Then we have:  
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where  Sit it S it S s XS V s XS V 1 ) , ( ) , ( µ − ≡ .  Then, to form expected value functions that are not 
conditional on SOSi,t+1 and SOWt+1, we simply take a weighted average of expressions like (16), 
each calculated at a different realization for SOSi,t+1 and SOWt+1, and weighted by the probability 
of that realization conditional on SOSit and SOWt, respectively. 
                                                           
12 Note that whether there is a scandal is not relevant, because next period we will have ST = 2 and the senator will 
not be up for re-election.   11
    Given this structure, we also obtain simple expressions for the probability that each 
alternative is chosen. Let 
k
it d  be an indicator variable equal to 1 if option k is chosen and 0 
otherwise, where k = S,E. Then, e.g., the probability that the senator decides to remain in the 
Senate is simply: 
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There is no important difference in the decisions of senators when ST = 2, except that, at 
that point, the future component of the value of the stay in Senate option is an expected 
maximum over the run for reelection and exit options, rather than the stay in Senate and exit 
options. Also, we let the standard deviation of the taste shocks differ at each value of ST, so ρ2S 
replaces ρ1S in all relevant expressions. 
  Now we describe the senator’s decision when ST = 3. At that point the senator’s seat is 
up for election, and he/she has the options of running for reelection or leaving Congress. If 
he/she decides to run, the probability of winning is ps(XSit).
13 We allow the probability of 
winning to potentially depend on all the senator’s state variables (including the unobserved skill-
type), as discussed in Section 4. Note that we do not model the outcome of primaries and general 
elections separately. If a senator loses a bid for reelection we do not distinguish if this was due to 
losing a primary or a general election. 
  If the senator wins the reelection bid, then he/she will sit in the Senate for two years, and 
then make a decision regarding whether to continue. A rather subtle point with regard to timing 
in the model is thus that the senator, at the time he/she decides whether to run for reelection, 
does not yet know the draw µ1Sit+1 for utility from continuing to sit in the Senate that will be 
revealed when ST = 1. Thus, the expected payoff to winning is given by the expected value of 
(14): 
(18)   ) , ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( 1 , s XS EV t XS p Achieve t W s XS EV t i d AS it AS i S S it S + − + + + = π δ α α  
 
Then we have: 
 
                                                           
13 We assume the Senator decides whether to run before the random variable Scandalit is realized. Thus, the decision 
to run is based on a probability of wining that is the weighted average of the probabilities with and without a 
scandal. We fix the probability of a scandal at 0.0049 in the Senate, which is equal to the frequency in the data.   12
(19) ) ( ) ( )) ( 1 ( ) , ( ) ( ) , (
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This says that the value of running for the Senate is equal to the probability of winning times the 
expected value of sitting in the Senate for the next period, plus the probability of losing times the 
value of exit (recall that a senator who loses a reelection bid then makes a post-congressional 
career decision), plus the term (αRS + µRSit). Here, αRS is the mean utility a senator gets from 
running for the Senate (which may be positive or negative, and whose sign is not obvious a 
priori), and µRSit is the idiosyncratic component of the utility of running for reelection, which is 
specific to senator i at time t. Finally, XP it
* denotes the XPit sub-vector of XSit with VEit set to 0, 
since the senator exits via losing rather than voluntarily. 
Letting µRSit be the difference of two independent type I extreme value error terms, each 
with standard deviation ρRS, we then have: 
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where  RSit it RS it RS s XS V s XS V µ − ≡ ) , ( ) , ( . The choice probability expressions are similar to (17).  
3.  Decisions of Representatives 
Decisions of representatives are more complex than those of senators, because representatives 
may have the option of running for the Senate. Moreover, because Senate terms are six years 
while House terms are only two years, a representative will not have the option of running for 
higher office in every election. A further complication is that, if a Senate seat is up for election, a 
representative’s chances of winning the seat depend critically on the seat’s incumbency status. If 
there is an incumbent senator of the representative’s own party running for the seat, then there is 
(presumably) little chance he/she can win it. If there is an incumbent running from the other 
party then the chances of winning may be better, but they are still likely to be small. If the seat is 
open, however, the representative’s chances of winning may improve substantially. 
Denoting by XHit the set of state variables that are relevant to the decisions and/or 
electoral prospects of representatives, we have: 
   13
(21) 
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where XPit denotes the vector of state variables relevant to post-congressional payoffs and the 
variables SOSit, SOWt, Partyi, Achievei, Scandalit and Cohorti were already introduced when we 
described the decision problem faced by senators.  
Clearly, the value of a House seat may be enhanced substantially if it is likely that the 
holder of that seat will have an option to run for Senate with a reasonably large probability of 
winning in the not too distant future. Thus, a key aspect of the representative’s problem is to 
forecast when Senate seats in his/her state will be up for election, whether an incumbent will be 
running when a seat does come up, and the incumbent’s party affiliation. The problem is 
complicated by the fact that each state has two senators. Furthermore, it is uncertain when (and 
if) Senate seats will become open, because senators may die in office, leave the Senate before the 
end of their terms or decide not to run when their terms run out.
14 
  To capture these features of the problem, it is useful to define new state variables that we 
call Cycle and INC. The position of a state in its “Senate cycle” refers to the number of periods 
until each of its two Senate seats comes up for election, baring unusual circumstance like death 
or early retirement of sitting senators. Cycle = 1,2,3 indexes the three possible positions in the 
Senate cycle for a state, which are (a,b) = (0,1), (0,2), or (1,2) respectively, where a is the 
number of periods until a Senate seat is first scheduled to come up, and b is the number of 
periods until the next Senate seat is scheduled to come up. Thus, e.g., when Cycle = 1 there is a 
Senate election scheduled for both t and t+1.  The variable Cycle evolves deterministically (i.e., 
scheduled elections are unaffected by deaths or retirements of senators). 
  INC = 1,…,4 indexes the four possible states of incumbency for a state’s two Senate 
seats, with the seats ordered in terms of which is scheduled to come up for election first (just as 
in the definition of Cycle). Letting D, R denote Democrat and Republican, respectively, the 
possibilities are (D, D), (D, R), (R, D), (R, R). Thus, e.g., if INC = 3 we have (R, D) which means 
                                                           
14 Clearly, a senator’s decision to not seek reelection may depend on the identity of the representatives who may 
seek election to the Senate as well as on the decisions of other senators. Similarly, a representative’s decision to run 
for the Senate may depend on whether other representatives from the same state are likely to do the same and on 
their identity. These considerations suggest that strategic interactions may play an important role and the decisions 
of all politicians may be viewed as outcomes of a dynamic game among the members of Congress. While certainly 
valuable such an extension is clearly beyond the scope of our analysis and in this paper we abstract from all 
strategic considerations.   14
the first seat scheduled to come up for election has an incumbent Republican, while the next has 
an incumbent Democrat. 
  Now we define values of the critical state variable ES (“election status”), which 
determines the set of options a representative faces. If ES = 1 there is no Senate seat up for 
election in the representative’s state, so his/her only options are to run for reelection or leave 
Congress. If ES = 2, 3 or 4 then there is a Senate seat up for election in the representative’s state. 
There is an incumbent Democrat or Republican senator running for reelection as ES = 2 or ES = 
3, respectively.  If ES = 4 the seat is open. 
  ES and INC evolve stochastically because of death and retirement by senators, and the 
uncertain outcome of future Senate elections. We specify that (INCit, ESit) evolves according to a 
conditional Markov process with transition probabilities: 
 
(22) ) , , | , ( ) , ( 1 , 1 , 1 , ), , ( it it it t i t i t i ES INC ES INC Cycle ES INC P n m p + + + =   m = 1,…,4; n = 1,…,4. 
 
The specification of these probabilities, which are constructed using empirical frequencies from 
our data set, is discussed more fully in Section 4.
15  
Another state variable relevant to electoral prospects is SODi (“state of the district”), 
which measures whether a representative’s district generally votes Republican or Democratic. 
We define SODi analogously to SOSit, except that we treat SOD as a fixed characteristic of a 
representative’s district. Thus, we assume that SOS and SOW capture all time varying aspects of 
the electoral climate. For instance, a Democratic representative in a strongly Democratic district 
will normally have a high probability of reelection, but this probability is lower in years when 
the state and/or national political climate are favorable for Republicans. Also note that SOSit and 
SOWt are relevant state variables for representatives for two other reasons: First, if a Senate seat 
is up for election they influence the chances of winning in a bid for higher office; Second, even if 
there is no Senate election in period t, SOSit and SOWt are still relevant, because they help to 
predict the probability of winning a Senate seat in the future. 
Two other state variables that are relevant to a representative’s electoral prospects are 
whether his/her current electoral district has been affected by redistricting (in which case the 
                                                           
15 Note that INC and ES could be predicted perfectly using lagged Cycle, INC and ES if incumbent senators always 
ran for reelection, and never left office due to death, appointment to other offices or early retirement.  Thus, these 
are the natural variables to use in predicting INC and ES.      15
dummy variable Redistit takes the value 1 and zero otherwise) and whether the politician is 
currently involved in a scandal (Scandalit). 
The last variable in (21) is Cohorti, which indicates whether a politician entered Congress 
in 1947-1965, 1967-1975 or 1977-1993. As we noted when discussing senators, one reason we 
include this state variable is to capture changes in congressional wages over time. Cohort is 
important for representatives for an additional reason. As is well known, House reelection 
probabilities have changed over time. A preliminary analysis of our data suggested clear breaks 
between these cohorts. Thus we include Cohort in the reelection probability functions that we 
discuss in Section 4. 
The timing of events in the decision process for a representative is as follows. At the end 
of his/her two-year term, the representative decides whether to exit, run for reelection, or, if the 
option is available, run for Senate. At the time this decision is made, the politician knows the 
state of his/her district (SOD), as well as SOS and SOW for the upcoming election. The 
representative also knows whether a Senate seat is up for election, whether an incumbent will 
run for the seat, and, if so, the party of that incumbent. All these variables, along with the 
stochastic realizations of Redist and Scandal, affect his/her reelection chances. If the politician 
decides to run for the House or Senate, he/she then gets a draw from a probability distribution 
that determines the election outcome. If the politician wins reelection to the House, he/she then 
gets a draw from a probability distribution that determines if he/she is made a member of a major 
committee.  There is also the possibility that the representative will achieve an important 
legislative accomplishment.  Then the process repeats itself. On the other hand, if the politician 
loses, then he/she chooses an exit option, and the process terminates.  
  Now consider a sitting representative’s decision when ES = 2, 3 or 4, so that the option of 
running for Senate is available.  The other two options are to run for reelection or to exit 
Congress.  The value of running for Senate is: 
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where h indicates that the politician is sitting in the House. Equation (23) resembles equation 
(19), the value to a sitting senator of running for Senate, except that: (i) the probability of 
winning, pHS(XHit), is different (in particular, it also depends on whether an incumbent senator is   16
running for the seat), and (ii) we allow the direct utility or disutility to a representative from 
running for a Senate seat, (αHS + µHSit), to differ from the utility or disutility that a sitting senator 
would receive. The probability that a representative wins a bid for a Senate seat is more complex 
than the probability a senator wins reelection, because pHS(XHit) depends not just on the 
representative’s characteristics, the state of the state, and the state of the world, but also on 
whether an incumbent senator is running for the seat. We describe pHS(XHit) in detail in Section 
4. 
  The value of running for reelection to the House is: 
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Here, pH(XHit) is the probability of winning reelection to the House, which we describe more 
fully in Section 4.
16 As was the case with Senate elections, we do not model the outcome of 
House primaries and general elections separately. The term αRH is the mean value of the direct 
utility that the representative gets from running for the House (which may be positive or 
negative, and whose sign is not obvious a priori), while µRHit is the idiosyncratic component of 
the utility of running for reelection, which is specific to House member i at time t.  
  The expected value of sitting in the House given reelection at time t is: 
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The first four terms in (25) capture the current component of the payoff from sitting in 
the house at time t. WH(t) is the wage, and αH is the monetized value of the utility of sitting in the 
House. The parameter αC is the monetized values of the utility of being named to a major House 
committee and is multiplied by the probability of being named to a major House committee, 
pC(XHit
*), to get the expected utility.
17 A representative of the type that values personal 
                                                           
16 The probability of winning for a representative will depend both on the realization of Scandalit and whether 
he/she is subject to redistricting. But we assume a representative decides whether to run before these are realized. 
Thus, the probability of winning in (24) is an unconditional probability integrated over the realizations of Redistit 
and Scandalit. The probability of redistricting is set at 0.2628, and the probability of a scandal in the House is set at 
0.0080, which are equal to the frequencies in the data.   
17 At this point it is worth recalling that in equation (7) we defined XPit as including the House committee status 
state variable COMit, which is therefore included in XHit. Hence, we let XHit* denote the vector of state variables 
XHit where COMit is replaced by COMit-1.   17
legislative achievements (i.e., Achievei = 1) may also receive additional utility that is contingent 
on having an important legislative accomplishment in that period. We denote the probability of a 
political achievement by a representative by pAH(XHit), while αAH is the monetized value of the 
utility increment generated by an achievement. Expected utility from legislative achievement is 
the product of these terms.
18 
The last term in (25) is the future component, which consists of the discount factor times 
the probability of survival to the next decision period, times the expected value of the state the 
representative will occupy at time t+1 when he/she next makes decisions about exiting Congress 
or running for office. This expectation is taken over five pieces of information that will be 
revealed after the representative is reelected at t but before he/she makes time t+1 decisions, and 
that affect the values that he/she will assign to the various choice options at t+1. These are 
whether the representative gets selected for a major committee after his/her reelection, along 
with SOS and SOW for the time t+1 election, and the status of the two Senate seats in his/her 
state at the time of the t+1 election.
19 Thus we have: 
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In the term EV(XHi,t+1, h), the state variables COM, SOW, SOS, ES and INC are all conditioned 
on, so the expectation is taken only over the draws for the time t+1 taste shocks for running for 
House and Senate, µHSi,t+1 and µRHi,t+1, which the politician cannot anticipate at time t, the 
possibility of a legislative achievement at time t+1, and the possibilities of a scandal and 
redistricting at t+1. If ES =l, where l = 2, 3 or 4, so that the option to run for Senate is 
available, then this has the form:     
 
                                                           
18 The assumption that only “achievers” derive utility from accomplishments guarantees that αH  and  αAH are 
separately identified. Otherwise, identification would hinge subtly on variation of pAH, the probability of 
achievement, with XHit.  
19 Note that legislative accomplishments are also revealed between re-election and the time t+1 decision. But utility 
from these accomplishments is derived instantaneously during the representative’s term, and so legislative 
accomplishments have no bearing on decisions at time t+1. Also, note that the values of Redist and Scandal at t+1 
are not realized until after the time t+1 decision is made.   18
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where  HSit t i RS t i RS h XH V h XH V µ − ≡ + + ) , ( ) , ( 1 , 1 , ,  RHit t i RH t i RH h XH V h XH V µ − ≡ + + ) , ( ) , ( 1 , 1 , , and we 
specify that µHSi,t+1 = ζ1it - ζ3it  and µRHi,t+1 = ζ2it - ζ3it , where ζ1it, ζ2it and ζ3it are mutually 
independent type I extreme value error terms. These have standard deviation ρ2H, ρ3H or ρ4H, 
depending on whether ES = 2, 3 or 4. This distributional assumption allows us to again apply the 
Rust (1987) formula to achieve a simple close-form expression for the expected maximum.  
Finally, given our distributional assumptions on the taste shocks, the probabilities that the 
representative chooses each of the three options at time t have simple forms.  Let 
k
it d  be an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if option k is chosen and 0 otherwise, where k = RH, RS, E.  Then, 
e.g., the probability that the representative decides to run for the Senate is simply: 
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where l = 2, 3, or 4, depending on whether ES = 2, 3, or 4.  
It is straightforward to work out the relevant value functions and probability expressions 
for a sitting representative’s decision when ES = 1, where the option of running for Senate is not 
available. This simply involves working through the same steps as above with the terms 
involving V RS eliminated where appropriate and ρ1H replacing H l ρ . 
4.  Probability Functions and Evolution of Exogenous State Variables 
In Sections 1 through 3 we have referred to functions that determine the probabilities of winning 
elections, achieving important legislative achievements and being named to a major House 
committee, and the evolution of the exogenous state variables SOSit, SOWit, INCit, and ESit.  In 
this section we describe the specifications we use in our analysis.   
  First consider Senate elections. The probability that a senator wins reelection or that a 
representative wins election to the Senate may be conveniently specified to have a logit form. 
Define the latent index USit by the equation:   19
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where HSEit is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if individual i is running for a Senate seat 
in period t from the House and 0 otherwise, I[.] is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if 
the expression within brackets is true and 0 if it is false, and νSit is a standard logistic error term. 
Then, defining U Sit = USit - νSit, the probability of winning reelection to the Senate and the 
























In the first expression in equation (30) we have HSEit = 0, while in the second expression we 
have that HSEit = 1. This specification allows the probabilities to depend on age, and previous 
congressional experience as captured by past terms in the House and Senate, as well as by the 
state of the state and the state of the world in terms of whether it is a good, bad or neutral for 
Democrats.
20  
Importantly, note that we let the intercept term in (29) depend on Skilli, thus allowing for 
unobserved heterogeneity in the probability of winning. Analogous to the wage function 
intercepts, one may think of the probability of winning function intercepts as differing because 
politicians have different endowments of political campaigning skills. We interpret Skill as 
                                                           
20 Note that indicators for (SOS=2, Party=R) and (SOW=2, Party=R) are excluded from (29). Thus, a Republican 
running in a neutral SOS and SOW is the base case. For Democrats, we can estimate a complete set of SOS 
interactions, because these are identified from differences with Republicans in those states. However, for Democrats 
we need to normalize on one SOW interaction, since the SOW interactions for Democrats are only identified by the 
differences across Democrats in those states. Thus, we also exclude the indicator for (SOW=1, Party=D).   20
capturing both occupational skill endowments and campaigning skill endowments. A key 
advantage of our framework is that it allows us to obtain estimates of the parameters of 
probability of winning functions like (29) that are adjusted both for such unobserved 
heterogeneity and for the selection bias created by politicians’ decisions about whether to run. 
Similarly, in order to specify the probability that a representative wins reelection to the 
House, define the latent index UHit by the equation: 
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where νHit is another standard logistic error term. As we discussed earlier, we included cohort 
effects in (31) because prior research and our own preliminary data analysis suggested these are 
important. The expression for the probability of winning election to a House seat, pH(XHit), is 
then similar to the ones in (30).
21 
Similarly, the probability that a representative is named to a major House committee after 
being elected to the House can also be conveniently specified to have a logit form.  Define the 
latent index UCit by the equation: 
 
                                                           
21 Note that indicators for (SOD=2, Party=R), (SOS=2, Party=R) and (SOW=2, Party=R) are excluded from (31). 
Thus, a Republican running in a neutral SOD, SOS and SOW is the base case. We also normalize by omitting 
indicators for (SOD=1, Party=D) and (SOW=1, Party=D), for reasons similar to those discussed in footnote 20 in 
the context of equation (29).    21
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where νCit is another standard logistic error term. Again, the expression for the probability of 
being named to a major House committee, pC(XHit
*), is similar to the one in (30). Like the 
probability of winning functions, this function also allows for heterogeneity in the intercepts, so 
that the probability of being named to a committee may also depend on the politician’s skill-
type. 
  The probability functions of achieving important legislative accomplishments by 
representatives and senators, pAH(XHit) and pAS(XSit), are also specified to have a logistic form. 
To minimize the number of additional parameters that need to be estimated, we adopt a simple 
specification where pAH is only a function of Achieve, TH, Party and COM, and pAS of Achieve, 
TS and Party. In particular, unobserved heterogeneity in preferences affects the probability of 
achieving important legislative accomplishments, and we assume that only “achievers” can 
obtain such accomplishments.
22 
As noted above, we specify that (INC, ES) evolves according to a conditional Markov 
process with transition probabilities ) , , | , ( 1 , 1 , it it it t i t i ES INC Cycle ES INC P + + . Of the 768 elements in 
this transition matrix, only 240 are feasible and, within this subset, only 56 are positive. Note 
that, unlike the probabilities of winning elections or being appointed to committees, it is assumed 
that these probabilities do not depend on unobserved heterogeneity and are not affected by 
selection.  Thus, rather than impose any structure on these probabilities, we estimate them in an 
                                                           
22 Since only “achievers” derive utility form legislative accomplishments it is reasonable to assume that they are the 
only politicians who will seek them.   22
unrestricted way from the data. We then treat those values as known in the solution and 
estimation of our model. 
The transition probabilities for SOS and SOW are also assumed to evolve according to 
two (independent) Markov processes with transition probabilities P(SOSi,t+1|SOSit)  and   
P(SOWt+1|SOWt), respectively. Again, we estimate these probabilities in an unrestricted way 
from the empirical transition frequencies, and use those values in estimation. The same is true for 
the death probabilities, πd, which are also estimated from the data for each age in an unrestricted 
way. Since information on retirement from post-congressional occupations is for the most part 
unavailable, the same procedure cannot be used to obtain estimates of the retirement 
probabilities, πr. Instead, we specify a logistic form for retirement probabilities after age 60: 
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and estimate the parameters π0 and π1 jointly with the other parameters of the model (we assume 
that the retirement probability before age 60 is equal to zero).  
5. Computational  Issues 
Estimation of a model like that described above proceeds iteratively. Given an initial guess for 
the values of the complete vector of model parameters, one solves the DP problem at those 
values. Then, given the solution of the DP problem, the likelihood is straightforward to 
construct, because, as we have seen, the choice probabilities are rather simple expressions, as are 
the wage densities for the wage data at the point of exit from Congress. At that point one forms 
derivatives of the likelihood, and determines a step for updating the parameter vector. Once the 
parameter vector is updated, one solves the DP problem again, obtains a new likelihood, and 
determines another step. And so on. 
The computational problem in estimating this type of model arises because hundreds or 
thousands of steps are typically required before the search algorithm converges to an optimum. 
And, on each step, the DP problem must be solved again at a new parameter vector. Thus, it 
must be possible to solve the DP problem quickly if estimation is to be feasible. Computational 
time depends critically on the size of the state space, since the value of each possible state must 
be computed to solve the DP problem.   23
     In spite of the fact that the DP problem described above is very large in terms of the size 
of the state space, our distributional assumptions allow us to obtain an “exact” solution. This 
means that we are able to calculate the value functions at every point in the state space, and we 
do not resort to approximate solution methods such as those described in Keane and Wolpin 
(1994) or Rust (1997), in which one only solves for value functions at randomly selected subsets 
of the state points and then interpolates to the remaining points.
23 Given the large number of 
state variables in our model, and hence the large size of the state space, it is rather unusual that 
we can adopt an exact approach of solving at every state point. Thus, in this section, we provide 
some discussion of how this is feasible. 
  Consider the size of the state space. In period t = 23, politicians can be in approximately 
300,000 states, given our specification of the state space. This is the largest size that the state 
space ever takes on. In period t = 24 the size of the state space falls, because politicians know 
that if they are elected to Congress at t = 24 they will have to exit at t = 25 (when they reach 80). 
Thus, variables which enter the state space at t only because they are relevant for forecasting the 
opportunity for running for higher office or getting re-elected at t+1 are irrelevant at t = 24. At t 
= 25, when agents must exit Congress, the state space becomes much smaller, because many of 
the state variables are not relevant to VE(XPit), the value of exiting Congress. The relevant set of 
state variables, XPit, is a rather small subset of the complete set of state variables. In fact, we 
calculate that at t = 25 politicians can only be in about 1,800 different states that are relevant to 
post-congressional payoffs. 
When we sum over all periods t = 1,…,25, we calculate that there are approximately 4 
million points in the entire state space, but only about 24,000 points in the state sub-space 
spanned by the state variables in XP. The fact that the number of possible values of the vector of 
state variables XPit that are relevant to post-congressional payoffs is (relatively) small is crucial 
to our being able to solve the DP problem exactly. The most computationally burdensome part of 
the solution of the DP problem is the evaluation of the integrals in (10), and this only needs to be 
done at this rather small subset of state points.  
                                                           
23 We put “exact” in quotes because, as always, the evaluation of integrals, transcendental functions, etc. on a digital 
computer is a numerical procedure subject to various forms of rounding and approximation error. In particular, in 
our case we use Monte-Carlo integration to evaluate the integrals over wage draws in (10) and (12). We use 100 
draws to evaluate these integrals. Results were not sensitive to increasing the number of draws.    24
In general, in our exposition of the model, we showed how only certain subsets of the 
complete state space, which we denoted by XP, XH, XS, and XH
*, were relevant for decision-
making in various contexts. Most of the calculations needed to solve the DP problem only need 
to be done at the state points in one of these subsets. Then, these sub-calculations can be added 
up (a fast operation) to form the value functions at all points in the complete state space.   
Next we consider the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity in the model. A difficulty 
that arises in the estimation of dynamic discrete choice models with unobserved heterogeneity is 
that the DP problem must be solved for each type of agent.  In forming the likelihood one then 
weights choice probabilities conditional on the agent being each type by the probability the agent 
is each type.  The need to solve the DP problem for each type makes it infeasible to assume a 
continuous distribution of types or even a large, discrete number of types. It was computationally 
feasible to estimate our model with four types.  
6.  The Likelihood Function 
It is useful to write the likelihood function in terms of separate components. The likelihood 
contribution at exit is: 
 
(34)  () ( ) ()








it XP d P XP W XP d P L













Here, the first term is the likelihood contribution if the politician takes a job in the private sector 
(j = 1) or in the public sector (j = 2).   ( ) it j XP | ⋅ φ  denotes the wage density in sector j. This term 
only enters the likelihood for the subset (42%) of observations where we observe the wage. oit is 
a dummy variable which indicates if the wage is observed. The second term is the likelihood 
contribution if the politician retires (j = 3). Note that XPit is the same regardless of whether the 
politician exits Congress voluntarily (VEit = 1) or via losing an election (VEit = 0), except for the 
component VEit (see equation (7)). Note that all the components of XPit are observed by the 
econometrician except for Skilli. For our further exposition of the likelihood function, it will be 
useful to make the dependence of 
E
it L  on VEit and Skilli explicit by writing  () i it
E
it Skill VE L , .   25
Next, consider the likelihood contribution for a sitting senator at time t. Recall that if STit 
= 1 or 2 the senator’s choice is to stay in the Senate or exit Congress. If STit = 3 then it is the end 
of the senator’s six-year term and the choice is to run for reelection or exit Congress. If STit = 3 
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Here we have defined Typei = (Skilli,  Achievei). The first term in (35) is the likelihood 
contribution if the senator runs for reelection. In this case, he/she will either win (WINit = 1) or 
lose (LOSEit = 1). If the politician wins (i.e., WINit = 1), the winning probability pS(XSit) enters 
the expression. In addition, there will then be a realization for whether the politician attains a 
major legislative accomplishment in the next Congress. The term  () it
A
it XS L  is the likelihood 
contribution that derives from this event. It is defined as: 
 
(36)  () []
i Achieve
it AS it it AS it it
A
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Thus, if the politician wins and he/she is the achiever type (Achievei  = 1), this additional 
likelihood contribution involves the probability of an achievement pAS(XSit) and an indicator, 
which we denote ACHit, for whether an achievement is realized. Returning to the main 
expression in (35), we note that, in the event of a loss, the senator exits Congress, and gets the 
exit likelihood contribution associated with involuntary exit, () i
E
it Skill L , 0 . The second term in 
(35) is the likelihood contribution if the senator chooses to exit Congress. In this case, the 
senator gets the exit likelihood contribution associated with voluntary exit, () i
E
it Skill L , 1.   I f  STit = 
1 or 2, so that the senator is simply deciding whether to continue serving for the next two years, 
we have the simpler expression: 
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  Next, consider the likelihood contribution of a sitting member of the House at time t. In 
the case that ESit = 2, 3 or 4, so that the option to run for Senate is available, this is: 
    
(38)
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The first term is the likelihood contribution if the House member runs for reelection. In this case, 
he/she will either win or lose. In the event of a win, the representative will receive a draw for 
whether he/she is appointed to a major House committee, and whether he/she attains a major 
legislative accomplishment during the next term. The term  () it
C
it XH L  is the likelihood 
contribution that derives from the realizations of these events. It is defined as: 
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Here, ) , ( k XH L it
A
it for k = 0,1 denote the likelihood contributions from achievement given that 
the politician was not or was named to a major committee, respectively. Recall that the 
probability of achievement in the House depends on whether the representative is a member of a 
major committee. The expression for ) , ( k XH L it
A
it is similar to equation (36), except that 
pAH(XHit,k) replaces pAS(XSit). Returning to the main expression in equation (38), obviously, the 
second term is the likelihood contribution if the representative decides to run for the Senate, and 
the third term is the likelihood contribution if he/she voluntarily exits Congress. Note that, if the 
representative wins election to the Senate, his/her likelihood contribution is the probability of   27
winning a Senate bid from the House, pHS(XHit) times the term  () it
A
it XS L that arises from whether 
the person realizes a major legislative accomplishment in the Senate. 
Now, consider a person who is first elected to the House at time t0, serves in the House 
for  R+1 terms (i.e., he/she is reelected R times) and exits at t0+R+1. His/her likelihood 
contribution is: 
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where P(Type) for Type = 1,…,4 are the type proportions.  
We allow the probabilities that a politician is each of the four possible types to depend on 
a set of six background characteristics that we assume are exogenous. These are the following: 
Enter Senate is a dummy equal to 1 if the person starts his/her career in the Senate; Age at Entry 
indicates the member’s age when they first enter Congress; Family is an indicator for whether an 
individual has relatives who had served in Congress; Home is an indicator for whether an 
individual serves in the same state where he/she was born; Polexp is an indicator for whether an 
individual had political experience prior to entering Congress; and Party is an indicator of the 
politician’s party (1 if a Republican, 0 if a Democrat). The variables Family, Home, Polexp, 
Enter Senate and Age at Entry are not state variables in our model. However, we use them, 
together with party affiliation, to help predict the unobservable type of a politician. Specifically, 
we assume that the probability that Skilli = 1 and the probability that Achievei = 1 are logistic 
functions of these six variables. The probability that a politician is each of the four types can 
then be calculated by appropriately multiplying together the probabilities that he/she is a 
“skilled” type and an “achiever” type. 
  Next, consider a person who enters Congress via election to the Senate at time t0.  
Suppose he/she chooses to remain in the Senate and/or is reelected in S consecutive two-year 
periods and then exits Congress. His/her likelihood contribution is: 
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  Finally, consider a person who is first elected to the House at time t0, is reelected to the 
House R times, then is elected to the Senate at time t0+R+1, and then chooses to remain in the 
Senate and/or is reelected in S consecutive two-year periods before exiting Congress. His/her 
likelihood contribution is: 
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We maximized the log likelihood function using the BHHH algorithm.   
7. Data  Description 
We construct a data set containing detailed information on careers of all House and Senate 
members who entered Congress from 1947 (the 80
th Congress) to 1993 (the 103
rd Congress). Our 
data end in 1994, so we have complete histories on members who left Congress in January 1995. 
But histories are right-censored for members who, in 1994, were reelected to serve in the 104
th 
Congress. 
We define a career as uninterrupted service in Congress. A career is terminated the first 
time a member leaves Congress and either (i) chooses some other full-time occupation (either in 
the private or the public sector), (ii) retires from professional life, or (iii) dies.  If a member has 
multiple spells or interrupted service—an event that occurs in less than 5% of the cases—only 
the first spell is recorded.  Individuals in our data set may serve only in the House; or in both the 
House and then the Senate (uninterrupted); or only in the Senate. Our final sample contains 
1,899 career histories.
24   
For each individual in our sample, the data set contains the following information: (a) 
biographical data and record of congressional service; (b) record of committee membership, 
possible scandals while serving in Congress and congressional wages; (c) redistricting and 
congressional opportunities data; (d) record of important legislative accomplishments; (e) post-
                                                           
24 Ambiguous entries (e.g., missing information on a person’s middle name may prevent us from distinguishing 
members with the same first and last name) and observations with inconsistent or incomplete congressional records 
were dropped from the data. Members who serve in the Senate and then in the House—an extremely rare event—
are also dropped.   29
congressional data. We describe each part of the data set and the sources we used to construct it 
in turn. 
(a) Biographical Data and Record of Congressional Service:  
The main building block of our data set is the Roster of U.S. Congressional Office Holders 
(1789-1993) (ICPSR #7803) for the 80
th to 103
rd Congress. This data set contains 101 
variables that provide information about the members’ biographical characteristics, party 
affiliation and a complete record of their congressional service, including the reason why a 
member left Congress (e.g., because he/she was defeated in an election, retired, died in 
office, etc.). The official Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress (1789-present) was 
used to check each relevant entry in our data set.
25 The Biographical Directory was also used 
to collect data on each member’s age when entering Congress, whether they represented their 
state of birth, their educational background (i.e., whether they have a college degree and 
whether they have a law degree), whether they had relatives who had served in Congress, 
and whether they had political experience (i.e., they held another public office at the local, 
state, or federal level) prior to service in Congress. 
(b) Committee, Scandal and Congressional Wage Data:  
The Kiewiet and Zeng (1993) data set was used to obtain information about committee 
assignments for the 80
th to 99
th House. Additional committee data for the 100
th to 103
rd 
House were collected using the relevant issues of the Congressional Quarterly Almanac. The 
Kiewiet and Zeng data set was also used to obtain information about scandals involving 
alleged sexual or financial misconduct by members of Congress for the 80
th to 99
th House. 
Additional data about the occurrence of scandals for the 100
th to 103
rd House and for all 
senators in our sample were collected using the same procedures and definitions used by 
Kiewiet and Zeng from the archives of the New York Times. Information on the annual 
salaries of the members of the U.S. Congress was obtained from the relevant issues of the 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac.




                                                           
25 The directory is also available online at http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp. 
26 This information is also available online at http://www.congresslink.org/sources/salaries.html.   30
(c) Redistricting and Congressional Opportunities Data:  
A data set assembled by Gary Jacobson was used to obtain information about all the 
occurrences of redistricting that affected any of the House members in our sample. Note that 
although most redistricting activity occurs after a Decennial census, many instances of 
redistricting occur every election year because of State Supreme Court rulings. Information 
on opportunities for House members to run for a Senate seat and on the identity and party 
affiliation of the incumbent (if present) was obtained from the Roster of U.S. Congressional 
Office Holders, supplemented by relevant issues of the Congressional Quarterly Almanac for 
elections to the 103
rd Senate. 
(d) Legislative Achievements Data:  
The Mayhew (2000) data set contains detailed information about important legislative 
accomplishments by members of Congress (which Mayhew refers to as important “actions in 
the public sphere”) from the 1
st through the 100
th Congress.
27 These legislative achievements 
include the sponsoring of a major piece of legislation, the delivery of a famous speech, the 
casting of a decisive vote on an important policy issue etc. Using the same definitions and 
procedures used by Mayhew, we extended his data set to include important legislative 
achievements in the 101
th to 103
rd Congress based on the information reported in the relevant 
issues of the Congressional Quarterly Almanac. 
(e) Post-Congressional Data:  
For most members of Congress, the official Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress 
gives a short description of a member’s professional life immediately after leaving 
congressional service, including the date of death if applicable. Based on the available 
descriptions we assigned all individuals who did not die in office and were not still in 
Congress at the end of our sampling period to one of the following categories: (i) private 
sector, (ii) public sector, or (iii) retired.  
(i) Private Sector: The vast majority of former members of Congress who take jobs in the 
private sector work as lawyers, lobbyists, or political consultants. In these cases the 
description contained in the Biographical Directory is often sufficiently detailed to identify 
                                                           
27 According to Mayhew’s (2000, pp. x-xi) definition “`Actions’ are, in principle, moves by members of Congress 
that are to a significant degree autonomous and consequential—or at least potentially consequential—and that are 
noticed by an alert stratum of the public exactly because of their perceived current or potential consequentiality.”    31
the specific law firm they join, or at least its location. To obtain estimates of the annual 
salaries of former members of Congress who choose these post-congressional occupations 
we relied on survey information. In particular, we used the wage function estimates based on 
a survey of Chicago lawyers conducted for the years 1975 and 1995 by Sandefur and 
Laumann (1997). For each of these two years, Sandefur and Laumann estimate a wage 
function for lawyers and lobbyists by regressing their log wages on biographical variables 
such as age, gender, ethnicity and father’s occupation, as well as tenure, whether they 
attended an elite or prestigious law school, whether they were on their school’s Law Review, 
size of their practice, field of practice and their position within the firm (e.g., whether they 
are partners or associates).
28 To obtain information on all these variables for the relevant 
members of Congress in our sample we used the Biographical Directory, the Martindale-
Hubbell archive and State Directories of Registered Professional Lobbyists. The Martindale-
Hubbell archive provides detailed information about practicing lawyers in the U.S. including 
their address, field of practice, law school attended, year of admittance to bar, and 
membership of state bar associations.
29 The Directories of Registered Professional Lobbyists 
contain similar information for licensed lobbyists in each state.
30 Individuals that left 
Congress before 1985 were assigned estimates from the 1975 wage function; the others were 
assigned estimates from the 1995 wage function.  Both estimates are in 1995 dollars. In 
addition, since only Chicago lawyers participated in the survey used by Sandefur and 
Laumann, the imputed wages for each of the relevant individuals in our sample were adjusted 
to account for the actual location of their practice. To make this adjustment we used data on 
billing rates for partners in law firms in different U.S. cities that we obtained from various 
issues of the Lawyer’s Almanac. We then computed the ratios of average billing rates in each 
U.S. city relative to Chicago and multiplied the estimated wage for each individual by the 
appropriate coefficient depending of the location of their practice.
31 It is important to note 
                                                           
28 Law schools are coded as “elite” or “prestigious” according to whether they are ranked in the top-ten or top-
twenty schools, respectively, in the U.S. News and World Report surveys. Also note that the data used by Sandefur 
and Laumann does not contain information on congressional experience. 
29 Recent editions of the archive are available online at http://www.martindale.com. For earlier years, printed 
editions of the archive were used. In some cases we used phone interviews to determine the year when an individual 
had joined a law firm and their position within the firm. 
30 Most of these directories are available online. Printed editions are also available for each state. 
31 If the location of the law practice was not known we used the billing rates for the closets city to the place of 
residence.    32
that although our procedure for imputing post-congressional wages in the private sector has 
limitations (for example, it is likely to understate the actual variation in wages), it 
nevertheless allows us to capture important features of the data. A key observation is that by 
and large, when former members of Congress work as lawyers or lobbyists, they are hired as 
partners of the firms they join (which entails a substantial wage premium over associates 
positions), in spite of the fact that their experience as lawyers or lobbyists would typically 
not justify their being offered these positions. In other words, individuals with a similar 
vector of characteristics (ignoring congressional experience) would not be partners in the 
data set used by Sandefur and Laumann. Thus, we expect that the effect of congressional 
experience on one’s post-congressional wage (as a lawyer) will largely be captured by the 
effect of this experience on the chances of being made a partner. There are two other 
important related observations. First, the variance of wages of partners within law firms is 
rather small (which is due to the fact that partners share profits). Second, the variance of 
wages of partners across law firms is in large part explained by differences in location, size 
and field of practice (which are all factors we take into account in our imputation procedure, 
and which congressional experience presumably affects as well). The residual variation in 
wages, however, is clearly not zero, and hence the wage imputation procedure we use will in 
general understate the actual variation in wages. 
(ii) Public Sector: To obtain the annual salary of individuals who served in a federal public 
office in the first year after leaving Congress we used the relevant sections of the United 
States Code for the years 1948-1995. For members who served in a state-level public office 
after leaving Congress we used the relevant sections of the Book of the States for the years 
1948-1995. Salary information about members who served in a county/city-level public 
office after leaving Congress was collected by directly contacting the relevant institution 
(e.g., the mayoral office).
32  
(iii) Retired: Information about pensions was collected using the relevant sections of the 
United States Code as well as the Federal Pensions Regulations for the years 1948-1995. 
These sources contain detailed information about eligibility requirements.  For instance, 
annuities are paid only to members who are at least 62 years old and who have completed at 
least six years of service, members who are at least 60 years old and who have completed at   33
least ten years of service, and members who are at least 50 years old and who have 
completed at least twenty years of service. In all these cases, members have to be separated 
from the service to be eligible for benefits.  Annuities are equal to 2.5% of a member’s 
average annual salary while in Congress for each year of service, up to 80% of his or her 
salary prior to exiting Congress.  
Finally, to construct the SOD, SOS and SOW variables we used the Brady and Rivers 
(unpublished) electoral data set (1952-1996), which is based on the relevant issues of the 
Congressional Quarterly Guide to U.S. Elections as well as the America Votes series. The 
procedures we used to construct these variables are as follows. We classify the overall state of 
the world (SOW) to be good, neutral, or bad for the election of Democrats based on the overall 
vote in all congressional elections to the House of Representatives.
33 Define the normalized 
Democratic national vote share as D(n)/[D(n) + R(n)], where D(n) is the total vote for Democrats 
in House elections nationally, and R(n) is the total vote for Republicans. If the normalized 
national vote share is more than 58% Democratic, we classify SOW as good for Democrats 
(SOW = 3).  If the vote share is in the 55-58% range we classify SOW as neutral (SOW = 2), and 
if the vote share is less than 55% Democratic we classify SOW as relatively good for 
Republicans (SOW = 1). The bias in these figures reflects the fact that Democrats received the 
majority of the national vote in House elections in all years of our sample period. These cut off 
points generate a distribution where each value of SOW occurs roughly a third of the time. Next, 
we construct SOS to be a measure of the state of a state relative to the national political climate. 
Define D(s)/[D(s) + R(s)] as the normalized vote share for the Democrat in the presidential 
election in state s in a particular year. Comparing the state level vote share to the national 
presidential vote share, SOS is classified as good for the Democrats (SOS = 3) if the difference in 
vote shares is greater than 4%. SOS is classified as neutral (SOS = 2) if the difference is between 
4% and –4%, and SOS is classified as bad for Democrats (SOS = 1) if the difference is less than 
–4.
34 These cutoffs again generate a distribution with roughly a third of observations in each 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
32 All nominal figures were converted into 1995 dollars using the CPI deflator.  
33 We use the overall House vote rather than the presidential vote for two reasons.  First, the presidential vote occurs 
only every four years.  Second, the presidential vote may be dominated by the particular personalities of the 
presidential candidates, and not accurately reflected circumstances in local elections. In contrast, the cumulative 
House vote should not be dominated by individual personalities.      
34 Here we use the presidential vote rather than the state-wide House shares because state-wide House vote shares 
may be dominated by local personalities, especially in states with only a few congressional districts.  We hope the   34
range. Finally, to construct SOD, which is a (constant over time) measure of the typical political 
climate in a district, we first construct the intermediate variable ASOD using the same procedure 
we used to construct SOS, except that it is based on the district level presidential vote relative to 
the national vote. Next, to convert this to a constant over time measure, we use the following 
procedure: For each representative i we compute the average difference between SOSit and 
ASODit over his/her career horizon and we classify a district as good for Democrats relative to 
the State the district belongs to (SOD = 3) if the average difference is greater than 0.25, as bad 
(SOD = 1) if it less than –0.25, and as neutral (SOD = 2) otherwise. These cutoffs again generate 
a distribution with roughly a third of observations in each range. Finally, note that although we 
assume that the state of the district a representative is in remains constant over his/her time 
horizon, the state of a district is allowed to change as the identity of the representative of that 
district changes. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
influence of the personalities of particular presidential candidates cancel out when we take the difference in state vs. 
national presidential votes.   35
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